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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
State Consent and Disagreement in
International Law-Making.
Dissolving the Paradox
SAMANTHA BESSON∗
Abstract
This article startswith a paradox: international law-making is riddenwith reasonable disagree-
ment andyetno state canbeboundby international lawwithout its consent andhencewithout
agreement. Breaking away from the pragmatic resignation that prevails among international
law scholars on this question, the article proposes an interpretation of the role of state consent
that bothﬁts and justiﬁes its central role in the practice of international law-making and, hope-
fully, strengthens the latter’s legitimacy in the future. Its proposed justiﬁcation actually lies
in the circumstances of reasonable disagreement among democratic states and this proposal
dissolves the paradox. The article argues that, in international law as it is the case domestically,
consent is neither a criterion of validity of law nor a ground for its legitimate authority. It
also dispels two myths about state consent: its necessary relationship to legal positivism and
state sovereignty. Instead, the article argues, the role of democratic state consent is that of an
exception to the legitimate authority of international law and hence to its bindingness in a
concrete case. While the legitimacy of international law is not democratic, the democratic
nature of states and their democratic accountability to their people matter. This is especially
the case in circumstances of widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement as they pre-
vail among democratic states in international law-making. In these circumstances, respecting
the sovereign equality of democratic states by requiring their consent is the way to grant an
equal voice to their people. Of course, there are limits to the democratic state exception that
are inherent to both its democratic dimension (it requires respecting basic political equality)
and its consensual dimension (it requires that consent is expressed in a free, fair and informed
fashion). The article concludes by showinghow theproposeddisagreement-attuned account of
democratic stateconsentexplainsvariouscharacteristicsof themain international law-making
processes, i.e., treaties and custom.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘A treaty is a disagreement reduced to writing (if one may be permitted
to do such violence to an ancient deﬁnition of a contract). But so is
legislation. The eventual parties to a treaty enter into negotiation with
different ideas of what they want to achieve. Negotiation is a process
for ﬁnding a third thingwhich neither partywants but both parties can
accept. The making of legislation, at least in a society with an active
system of politics, is a similarly dialectical process, by which conﬂicts
of ideas and interests are resolved into a legal formwhich then re-enters
the general social process as a new datum. A treaty is not the end of a
process, but the beginning of another process. And so is legislation.’
(P. Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’,
(1999) 10 EJIL 31, at 43)
Philip Allott, the international legal theorist, once said that international treaties
are best understood as ‘disagreement reduced to writing’.1
This was, and still is, an intriguing statement. Indeed, international treaties, but,
more broadly, international legal sources in general are predominantly,2 and despite
occasional normative3 and descriptive4 critiques, (understood as being) ‘based’5 on
1 P. Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’, (1999) 10 EJIL 31, at 43.
2 This is the case of themost important sources of international law (Art. 38 1945 Statute of the International
Court of Justice), i.e., treaties and customary international law. It also applies, however, to general principles,
judicial law, and even international organizations’ law to the extent that they rely indirectly on state consent
or, at least, on states’ converging practice. See also J. Klabbers, ‘Law-making and Constitutionalism’, in J.
Klabbers, A. Peters, and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009), 81, at 100, 114.
3 From a communitarian perspective of international law, see, e.g., G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of
International LawConsidered from the Standpoint of theRule of Law’, (1957) 92Recueil des cours de l’Acade´mie
du droit international de LaHaye 1, at 36; A. Pellet, ‘TheNormativeDilemma:Will andConsent in International
Law-Making’, (1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 22; B. Simma, ‘Consent: Strains in the Treaty
System’, in R. St.J. McDonald and D.M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays
in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (1983), 485; C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations arising for states without or
against theirwill’, (1993) 241-IVRecueil des cours de l’Acade´mie du droit international de LaHaye195; J.L. Charney,
‘Universal International Law’, (1993) 87 AJIL 529. From a value-based perspective of international law, see,
e.g.,N.Onuf, ‘TheConstitutionof International Society’, (1994)5EJIL1;T.A.Aleinikoff, ‘ThinkingOutside the
Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the US Constitution’, (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1989; J. Tasioulas,
‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International
Law (2010), 97; A. Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The
Philosophyof InternationalLaw (2010), 79;A.Peters, ‘GlobalConstitutionalismRevisited’, (2005)11 International
Legal Theory 39; H. Lau, ‘Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law’,
(2005) 6Chinese Journal of International Law495; R.Dworkin, ‘ANewPhilosophy for International Law’, (2013)
41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2. From a rational choice perspective of international law, see, e.g., L.R. Helfer,
‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’, (2008)University of Illinois Law Review 71; A.T. Guzman, ‘Against
Consent’, (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 747; G. Shaffer, ‘International Law and Global Public
Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’, (2012) 23 EJIL 683; J.P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law – Global
Government (2013).
4 See, e.g., M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’, (2002) 6Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
Law 37; M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent to Be Bound – Anything New under the Sun?’, (2005) 74 Nordic Journal
of International Law 483; C.P.R. Romano, ‘The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent’, (2007) 39NYU Journal of International Lawand
Politics 791; J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel, and J. Wouters (eds.), Informal International Law-Making (2012); N. Krisch,
‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in the Age of Global Public Goods’, (2014) 108 AJIL 1; J. Pauwelyn,
R. Wessel, and J. Wouters, ‘When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International
Lawmaking’, (2014) 25 EJIL 733.
5 What is actuallymeant by the vaguenotionof ‘being based’ is at the core of this article because accounts vary
a lot among international law scholars; some merely refer loosely to consent as a ‘principle’, a ‘meta-norm’,
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(state)6 consent.7 To that extent, international law is unlike domestic law where
consent to the lawhas long been considered peripheral or irrelevant to law-making,
whether as a criterion of validity or as a ground of legitimacy.8 Not the least, argu-
ably, due to the acknowledgement of widespread and persistent reasonable (moral-
political) disagreement about and in the law, i.e., disagreement among people who
think and converse in good faith and do their best to apply the general capacities of
reason pertaining to the domain.9
So, is disagreement really that irrelevant to the way we make international law?
But for a few exceptions,10 international lawyers have not yet addressed the issue
of reasonable disagreement, and certainly not from the angle of the central role of
state consent in international law-making.Most of them seem curiously resigned to
some formofpragmatic endorsementof consent and this evenwhen they reject it on
a ‘foundation’ or even an ‘axiom’ of international law (see, e.g., Guzman, supra note 3; Helfer, supra note 3),
while others explain what it does and regard it as the basis for either the validity of international law or
the international legal obligation and the legitimate authority of international law (see, e.g., J. Crawford,
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (2012), 20: ‘the general acceptance of states can create rules of
general application’; L.Henkin, International Law: Politics andValues (1995), 28: ‘No treaty, oldornew,whatever
its character, is binding on a state unless it has consented to it’). A similar ambivalence applies to the notion
of ‘consent’ that is rarely deﬁned (see infra notes 7 and 28).
6 Because states are the original and sole complete subject of international law and because international
law-making is still largelyhorizontal or decentralized, it is their consent that is at stake in the context ofmost
international law-making to date. I will not, as a result, discuss the issue of the direct participation of other
subjects of international law in non-inter-state international law-making in this article. In any case, contra
D.B.Hollis, ‘WhyConsentStillMatters–Non-StateActors,TreatiesandtheChangingSourcesof International
Law’, (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 137, I do not think that those subjects’ (esp. democratic)
participation in international law-making should be approached through consent. As I will argue in the
article, there are distinct democratic grounds for the role of state consent in international law-making: only
states can be democratic and enable the accountability of international law to their individual members (at
least to date) (see S. Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law – Lifting the State Veil’, (2009) 31 Sydney
Law Review 343; T. Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’ in S. Besson and J.
Tasioulas (eds.),The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 119; T. Christiano, ‘The Legitimacy of International
Institutions’, in A. Marmor (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (2012), 380).
7 Since the early twentieth century, and esp. PCIJ, S.S. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), Judgment of 7 September
1927, PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, para. 35: ‘The rules of law binding upon states . . . emanate from their own
free will.’; ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain),
Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970, [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 47: ‘Here, as elsewhere, a body of rules
could only have developed with the consent of those concerned.’; ICJ,Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para.
135: ‘In international law there areno rules, other than such rules asmaybe acceptedby the states concerned,
by treaty or otherwise.’ For critiques, however, see the individual opinions of judges: e.g., ICJ, Legality of the
Threat or Use of NuclearWeapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 (Declaration of President Bedjaoui) [1996]
ICJ Rep. 268, at 268–74;Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 (Declaration of Judge Simma), [2010] ICJ Rep. 478, at 479.
8 See, e.g., A.J. Simmons,Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979); J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986),
88 ff; J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (1995), 80–94; J. Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the
Service Conception’, (2006) 90Minnesota LawReview 1003, at 1028–9, 1037–40 on consent and the legitimate
authority of law.
9 See, e.g., T. Christiano, ‘Democracy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy/ on democratic legitimacy, reasonable
disagreement and consent. On the notion of ‘reasonable disagreement’ and its implications in legal theory
more generally, see S. Besson, The Morality of Conﬂict – Reasonable Disagreement in the Law (2005), at 91–119.
10 See, e.g., R.A. Falk, The Status of International Law in International Society (1970), 14; G. Binder, Treaty Conﬂict
and Political Contradiction – The Dialectic of Duplicity (1988); Klabbers, supra note 2; S. Ranganathan, ‘Between
Philosophy and Anxiety? The Early International Law Commission, Treaty Conﬂict and the Project of
International Law’, (2012) 83 BYIL 82.
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another conceptual or normative ground.11 To address this apparent paradox, we
need to enquire into the potential role of consent, agreement and disagreement in
international law-making. Discussions of disagreement in legal philosophy have
almost exclusively concentrated on domestic law so far.12 It is time therefore to
broaden our legal philosophical scope,13 and to venture into a discussion of dis-
agreement in international law.
In short, my argument is that moral and social pluralism is actually greater in
international law than it is domestically, thus making the existence,14 but also the
role of reasonable disagreement in law-making evenmore central internationally. I
submit that it is precisely due to those circumstances of international law-making,
however, and to its decentralized15 and non-democratic features additionally, that
(democratic) state consent should remain central to international law-making. To
do so, it should not be conceived as it usually is through voluntarist, contractualist,
or other classical analogies with individual consent and self-determination,16 and
especially not as a criterion of legal validity or as a ground of legitimate authority
of international law. We should set aside the conception of state consent that has
predominated in many conﬂict-averse and dispute-settlement understandings of
international law since the early twentieth Century,17 whereby international law is
understood to signal the end of politics and hence of disagreement.18 Instead, it is a
revised account of consent attuned to the circumstances of reasonable disagreement
and as a way to channel and manage disagreement one should endorse, one that
is at home with the legal pluralism, conﬂicts and fragmentation that characterize
international law today.19
The proposed interpretation of consent in international law-making ﬁts and
justiﬁes the practice of international law, and two of its dimensions in particular.
Firstofall: consent,whenit is required ininternational law-making,doesnotamount
to strict agreement only, but rather to an agreement to disagree further. And second:
when consent is not required in international law-making, it is only when that
normative process is situated outside of the formal sources of international law.
11 See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 2, at 100, 114. See also the numerous textbooks that start by discussing, often
critically, consent as ground of international legal obligation, but independently from their conclusion in
that ﬁrst section, then invariably end up presenting and defending a consent-based account of international
law-making: see, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 5; A. Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations – An Introduction to the Role
of International Law in International Relations (2012).
12 See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986); J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999); Besson, supra note 9.
13 See Besson, supra note 9, at 534–7.
14 See L. Murphy,WhatMakes Law – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (2014), 181.
15 See also Falk, supra note 10, at 178.
16 See evenMurphy, supra note 14, at 179who identiﬁes consent and voluntarism in international law. See also
J. Tasioulas, ‘Custom, Jus Cogens and Human Rights’, in C. Bradley (ed.), Custom’s Future: International Law in
a ChangingWorld (2016), forthcoming.
17 See especially, H.J. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspﬂege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen (1929). See, more
generally, A. Orford, ‘Scientiﬁc Reason and the Discipline of International Law’, (2014) 25: 2 EJIL 369 on the
relationship between international law as a discipline and scientiﬁc positivism in the history of interna-
tional law. See, however, J. d’Aspremont and J. Kammerhofer, ‘Introduction: the future of international legal
positivism’, in J. Kammerhofer and J. d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-ModernWorld
(2014), 1, at 5–6.
18 See also Ranganathan, supra note 10.
19 See,e.g., J.Crawford,Chance,Order,Change:TheCourseof InternationalLaw–GeneralCourseonPublic International
Law (2014).
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First of all, then, the proposed disagreement-attuned understanding of consent
accounts for the dualistic practice of international law that demonstrates both
traits of agreement and disagreement. This can be exempliﬁed on the basis of the
current practice of international treaty law (that refers to mutual agreement as a
constitutiveelementoftreaties,but,atthesametime,entailsrulesonreservations,on
interpretation, andon intractable treaty conﬂicts that all conﬁrmhowdisagreement
is allowed to continue in the practice of treaties despite the original agreement20)
or of customary international law-making (that is based on a converging albeit non-
unanimous practice as a constitutive element, but, at the same time, entertains the
possibility of persistent objection that conﬁrms how agreement matters after all in
the disagreement21).
Secondly, and even more importantly, the proposed argument for the import-
ance of state consent in international law-making also accounts for the, irritating to
some,22 resilience of consent in the formal sources of international law. Of course, it
has not been uncommon for international lawyers to observe or predict its erosion
based on the practice.23 What is often mentioned indeed is that treaties have de-
creased in number since the 1990s, that a lot of the treaties concluded since then
have third-party effects and that customary international law, judicial law, and
international organizations’ law are becoming more and more majoritarian and
less consensual in the way they are produced. All the same, the changes usually
identiﬁed are mostly located at the periphery and, one may even argue, outside of
international law:24 it sufﬁces to think of the development of soft law or of unilat-
eral law by powerful states.25 Thus, although there are new non-consensual means
of international co-operation, neither of them are (yet) regarded as sources of in-
ternational law stricto sensu. The latter are all still mostly consent-based. Whether
one regards sources of international law as a contingent feature of legality or as a
conceptual-normative one, doctrinal practice shows that the sources of Article 38
of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are still regarded as
the formal sources of international law. So, if there is a threat to state consent in in-
ternational law-making, it is external rather than internal to international law. One
way to account for this, therefore, and to react is precisely to re-conceive consent,
as I propose, so as, ﬁrst, to accommodate disagreement in agreement in treaty-
making and customary international law-making and, second, to enable the revised
20 See, e.g., J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (1996); Binder, supra note 10; J. Klabbers, ‘On
HumanRights Treaties, Contractual Conceptions and Reservations’, in I. Ziemele (ed.),Reservations to Human
RightsTreaties and theViennaRegime:Conﬂict,HarmonyandReconciliation (2004), 149; J.Klabbers,TreatyConﬂicts
and the European Union (2009); Ranganathan, supra note 10.
21 See, e.g., N. Petersen, ‘Customary Law, Consent and the Status Quo Paradox’, in C. Bradley (ed.), Custom’s
Future: International Law in a Changing World (2016), forthcoming; O. Elias, ‘Persistent Objector’,Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (2012), Vol. VIII, 280.
22 See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 2, at 113–14; J. Klabbers, ‘Not Re-Visiting the Concept of Treaty’, in A.
Orakhelashvili and S. Williams (eds.), 40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2010), 29;
Murphy, supra note 14, at 179–82.
23 See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 3; Aleinikoff, supra note 3; Peters, supra note 3; Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent’, supra
note 4; Romano, supra note 4; Helfer, supra note 3; Clapham, supra note 11, at 50–1.
24 See also Krisch, supra note 4, at 2, 26 ff., 34.
25 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 3; Helfer, supra note 3; Pauwelyn,Wessel, andWouters, Informal, supra note 4.
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understanding of consent to do its share ofwork in the legitimation of international
lawwithout driving somematters outside of the scope of international law.
The structure of the proposed argument is ﬁve-pronged and so is the structure
of the present article. After a ﬁrst section on the presentation of what is meant by
‘consent’ and ‘disagreement’ in domestic and international law (Section 2), the next
section explainswhy consent cannot and shouldnot be considered either a criterion
of legal validity or a ground for the legitimate authority of law, be it domestically or
in international law (Section 3). In a second step, further popular myths about the
role of state consent in international law-making are dispelled, and in particular in
relation to its alleged ties to legal positivism and state sovereignty (Section 4).What
the next section argues, however, is that state consent can and should still play a
distinctive role in international law (Section 5). Arguably, the role of state consent
is best understood and justiﬁed by reference to the circumstances of reasonable
disagreement about and in international law, and hence to state democracy and
equality. This only applies, however, within the limits of what democratic state
consent can actually amount to, and this means within the limits of both basic
political equality and the free and fair nature of consent. This in turn enables me
to explain, in the last section, how consent remains a central element in most
sources of international law and to justify that centrality, and in particular to show
how agreement and disagreement go hand in hand in the practice of international
treaties and customary international law (Section 6).
A methodological caveat is in order before going forward, however. Unlike pre-
vious discussions of consent in international law-making, the present one is both
descriptive andnormative.Manyarguments put forward todefend it or rebut it have
been expressed as factual claims about the degree of importance of consent in the
practiceof international law, submitted to judgmentsof truthor falseness.Others, on
the contrary, have focused on conceptual or normative considerations to establish
whether or not consent could be considered as a criterion of validity or as a ground
of legitimacy. The difﬁculty is that both dimensions are needed for any argument
about consent in international law-making to succeed, and one cannot be severed
from the other or, worse, confused with one another.26 Indeed, law is a normative
practice in which the conceptual-normative level plays a very important function
and cannot simply be replaced by either factual observations or mere normative
considerations.27
2. FROM ‘CONSENT’ TO ‘AGREEMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A lot of the difﬁcultieswith the notion of consent in international law stem from its
polysemy. It is used tomean different things thatmay then relate very differently to
the validity or legitimacy of international law.
26 See the identiﬁcation at times between ‘consent’ and ‘consensualism’ in Krisch, supra note 4.
27 See also Klabbers, ‘Not Re-Visiting’, supra note 22, at 31 on the concept of ‘treaty’ and its relationship to
changes in the factual circumstances of treaty-making.
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Because of the link made in this article between consent (Section 2.1) and agree-
ment (Section 2.2), and, by extension, between consent and disagreement, it is
important to deﬁne both notions.
2.1. ‘Consent’ in international law
Deﬁning consent is by no means easy as most international legal scholars do not
explain what theymean by it.28
A cursory survey of the use of the term ‘consent’ in international law reveals that
consent is used to refer both to the ‘free will’ of states and to their ‘acceptance’ of
international law.29 This comes close to the uses of consent one encounters in do-
mestic law, more generally. There, consent is often equated with self-determination
and can have a voluntarist ﬂavour, on the one hand, while also being used to mean
acquiescenceandpositivevotingandcanhaveaparticipatorycolour, on theother. In
what follows, consent is understood as the latter: acceptance of a given international
legal norm. Its original voluntarist dimensionwill also be discussed, however, albeit
eventually set aside.
In international law, like in domestic law and politics, consent can be express, as
in the signature or ratiﬁcation of a treaty, but also tacit, as in the absence of objection
to a reservationor to a custom in themaking. There are also contexts, like customary
international law-making for instance, inwhich consent occursnot by expressingor
stating, but bydoing – as in a convergingpractice or inparticipating in international
law-making,moregenerally.Asamatterof fact,customaryinternational law-making
combines tacit consent in the converging practice of states and explicit dissent in
their possibility to object to that practice through a persistent objection.
Twofurtherconceptualpointsareworthemphasizingaboutthenotionofconsent
in international law: their subjects and their objects.
First of all, the subjects of consent. Interestingly, the collective nature of the actor
consentingininternational law, i.e., thestate, constitutesakeydifferencetodomestic
lawwherewhat isusuallyat stake is individual consent.Curiously, thecollectiveand
institutional structure of states has not been discussed by international law scholars
as potentially invalidating any analogy between state and individual consent. Of
course, such a ready individual analogy ﬁts the broader and widespread approach
to states as unitary subjects of international law that pervades international law
scholarship and reduces states to individuals in a domestic setting.30 I will come
back to this question later on as it is at the core of a central tension inmost accounts
28 Even in essays devoted to consent in international law such as e.g., Hollis, supra note 6; Helfer, supra note
3; Guzman, supra note 3; Krisch, supra note 4, at. See, however, Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent’, supra note 4, at 484:
‘The role of the procedures of consent to be bound is to constitute a mechanism by virtue of which a treaty
becomes binding on states, or, as it was described, acquires characteristics of a “juridical act”.’ See also D.B.
Hollis, ‘Deﬁning Treaties’, in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2012), 11, at 19–21.
29 Since the early twentieth century, and esp. PCIJ, Lotus Case, supra note 7, para. 35: ‘The rules of law binding
upon states . . . emanate from their own freewill’; ICJ,Nicaragua, supranote 7, para. 135: ‘In international law
there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the states concerned, by treaty or otherwise’;
ICJ, Barcelona Traction, supra note 7, para. 47: ‘Here, as elsewhere, a body of rules could only have developed
with the consent of those concerned.’
30 For a critique, see Besson, supra note 6, at 358–65; J. Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’, (2006) 30
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 15, at 21 ff. See also I. Venzke, ‘Post-modern perspectives on orthodox
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of consent in international law. The collective dimension of state consent is crucial,
I will argue, to understand its role in international law-making and especially to
understand its democratic justiﬁcation.
Secondly, the object of consent. Regrettably, the question is not usually broached
by international law scholars. If consent is central to international law-making, it
should apply to thewhole range of objects of international lawwithout restrictions,
includingmoral-political issues suchashumanrights, climate justice, disarmament,
anti-terrorism, or global poverty. In rational choice approaches to consent, however,
state consent is usually reduced to consent regarding state interests and hence to
self-interested consent. These accounts then necessarily conclude to the so-called
status quo bias of state consent and to its disabling effect in common problem-
solving, as a result.31 This objection need not worry us, however. To start with, the
importance of individual interests in political and legal decision-making, besides
concern for the moral-political issues at stake, is a well-known feature of political
and in particular democratic deliberation processes.32 Moreover, the interests of
collective and institutional agents like states need not be self-oriented only and
could actually encompass more community-oriented concerns. It is likely, ﬁnally,
that collective and institutional agents like states can actually be designed so as to
enhance their ability to consent by reference to other factors than their interests.
This is deﬁnitely the case of democratic states, and I will come back to this issue
later on.
2.2. ‘Agreement’ in international law
There are many understandings of ‘agreement’ (and disagreement qua absence of
agreement) in legal and political theory. As I have argued elsewhere, it is best
understood as unanimous (intersubjective) acceptance for the same reasons by
opposition to mere overlapping consensus on different grounds.33 This is also how
I will understand agreement in international law in this article. The relationship
between consent so deﬁned and agreement becomes clear when confronted with
the ‘acceptance’-understanding of consent that has just been discussed.
Thisactuallymatches theunderstandingofconsentquaagreementoneencounter
in international law. Although international law-making by consent is sometimes
referred to as ‘consensual’,34 it does not necessarily imply aiming at ‘consensus’. Of
course, in practice, searching for consensus is a way of then securing unanimous
consent by all states, but not necessarily so. Generally, ‘consensus’ is actually used in
international law to refer to a (non-unanimous) converging practice, distinct from
positivism’, in J. Kammerhofer and J. d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-ModernWorld
(2014), 182, at 187.
31 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 3, at 747, 754–5; Helfer, supra note 3; Shaffer, supra note 3; Trachtman, supra
note 3.
32 SeeMansbridge et al., ‘The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy’, (2010) 18
The Journal of Political Philosophy 64.
33 See Besson, supra note 9, at 19–21. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 389 on consensus as a modus
vivendi of different disagreeable positions.
34 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 3; Krisch, supra note 4.
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(unanimous) agreement (by consent).35 It is the case, for instance, in customary
international law36 – at least in the ﬁrst phase, as we will see.
The source of international law that epitomizes theunderstandingof consent qua
agreement is the international treaty.37 Treaties are actually referred to by Article
2(1)(a) of the1969ViennaConventionof theLawofTreaties (VCLT) as ‘international
agreements’. Agreement is deﬁned in that context as the mutuality of expressed
consents to be bound by a treaty (Arts. 2(1)(b) and 11 VCLT).38 The expression of
consent can takedifferent shapes andnames suchas, andnot exclusively, ‘signature’,
‘ratiﬁcation’, ‘accession’, ‘acceptance’ or ‘approval’ (Arts. 11–17 VCLT).39 Their exact
meaning remains surprisingly open, however.40
Importantly, treatiesaremorethanagreements.Theyarebasedonmutualconsent
or agreement, but it is only oneof their constitutive elements. They actually amount
to agreements ‘governed by international law’ (Art. 2(1)(a) VLCT) or, in more direct
terms, agreements binding by reason of international law and qua international law.
What this means is still subject to controversy, however.41 The best interpretation
is that treaties qua agreements are unlike contracts or mutual promises that are
governed by themselves or, if the parties so wish, by (domestic) private law. Their
being (governed by) international law cannot indeed be excluded by the states
parties.42 Or else they could not amount to a source of international law. This
explains in turn why, contrary to what one may sometimes read, the expression of
mutual consent in international treaties is not in itself the ground of international
legalobligations,but it is theirbeing(asourceof) international lawthat is. Iwillcome
back to this in the context of the discussion of the relationship between consent and
legal validity.
Importantly, this understanding applies to so-called ‘treaty-contracts’ as much as
to ‘legislative-contracts’. Those labels are unfortunate, however, to the extent that,
35 See also Pellet, supra note 3, at 47; K. Zemanek, ‘Majority Rule and Consensus Technique in Law-Making
Diplomacy’, in R. St.J.McDonald andD.M. Johnston (eds.),The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays
in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (1983), 857. See, e.g., on European consensus in the ECtHR’s case-law:
L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson, and S. Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European
Court on Human Rights’, (2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248. Of course, the search for overlapping
consensus is a common technique in international law-making, and so are compromises. As in domestic law,
however (see Besson, supranote 9), those techniques are best understood as reactions topersistent reasonable
disagreement. And unlike what applies domestically, moreover, agreement remains central to international
law-making, hence this article’s paradox in the ﬁrst place.
36 See, e.g., Tasioulas, supra note 16, on opinio juris qua “consensus” as opposed to “consent”.
37 See also G. Korontzis, ‘Making the Treaty’, in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2012), 177, at 184.
38 Curiously, there is nomention ofmutuality in Arts. 2 and 11 VCLT and the term only appears in passing and
much later in the VCLT.
39 See Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent’, supra note 4, at 484–5; A. Aust,Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2013), Ch. 2–3; P.
Gautier, ‘Article 2’, in O. Corten and P. Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2011), 33;
Korontzis, supra note 37; Hollis, ‘Deﬁning’, supra note 28, at 676–85.
40 See, e.g., Hollis, ‘Deﬁning’, supra note 28, at 19–21; Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty, supra note 20, at 40, 51;
Aust, supra note 39, at 12; M. Fitzmaurice and O. Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (2005), 6–25.
41 See, e.g., Hollis, ‘Deﬁning’, supranote 28, at 25–8; Klabbers,The Concept of Treaty, supranote 20, at 40, 51; Aust,
supra note 39, at 12; Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 40, at 6–25.
42 This explains why states parties cannot decide that a treaty, once concluded, will not be binding (e.g., qua
‘Memorandum of understanding’). See also Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty, supra note 20, at 212–16, 249 and
Klabbers, ‘Not Re-Visiting’, supranote 22, at 29 (in reply toAust, supranote 39, Ch. 3); J. Klabbers, ‘TheValidity
and Invalidity of Treaties’, in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2012), 551.
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on the proposed reading, treaties are never contractual. What these labels capture
in fact is another difference between treaties: some are reciprocal in the structure
of the rights and obligations they give rise to, arguably due to their content, and
hence canbe compared to contracts to that extent,while others cannot.43 As a result,
while it is common among international law scholars to refer casually to the terms
‘contractual’ or ‘contractualism’ to capture the role of state consent in international
law-making,44 I suggest it should be avoided. This is not to say, of course, that states
may not conclude contracts and hence use consent to do so. As I explained before,
however, when they do so, they do not create international law and the source of
their obligations is not a treaty.
3. CONSENT AND THE VALIDITY AND LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A lot of the resistance to consent in legal theory stems from its inability to be a
criterion for the validity of law, on the one hand, and to amount to a ground for
the legitimate authority or legitimacy of law, on the other. This also applies, by
extension, to its role in international law. In what follows, I will address both issues
in turn. Of course, they are intimately related to the extent that the law should be
made (its validity; Section 3.1) in such a way that it can claim to be legitimate and
hence to bind/give rise to obligations to obey (its legitimacy; Section 3.2).45
3.1. Consent and the validity of international law
Oneunderstandingof the roleof consent in international law-making is thatconsent
amounts to a, or even the, source of international law or, at least, to one of its
dimensions. In short, it is seen as a criterion for the validity of international law qua
law.
There are two critiques onemaymake to this approach to state consent, however:
one conceptual-normative and the other descriptive.
As Herbert Hart pointed out early on, ﬁrst of all, this understanding of state
consent, and in particular of treaties, is conceptually confused. It begs the question
of what makes treaties international law in the ﬁrst place, and hence binding qua
source of law.46 What explains that treaties or any other source of international
law gives rise to norms of law, i.e., norms that bind qua law, cannot be that their
subjects (i.e., states) have consented to them. On the contrary, it is a rule of law
43 See, e.g., in the context of human rights treaties, R. Higgins, ‘Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity’,
(1989) 15 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 598; M. Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human
RightsTreaty in International Law’, (2000) 11EJIL 489; S. Besson, ‘TheSources of InternationalHumanRights
Law’, in S. Besson and J. d’Aspremont (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (2017),
forthcoming. See also Hollis, ‘Deﬁning’, supra note 28, at 38–9.
44 The VCLT itself also refers to ‘contracting’ states before they become parties to the treaty (Art. 2(1)(f)). This
is common to all regimes of international law.
45 See also Besson, supra note 6, at 346–8.
46 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), 226–8. See also Murphy, supra note 14, at 179; Dworkin, supra note 3,
at 9–10; Klabbers, supra note 2, at 113.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 May 2016 IP address: 134.21.34.252
STATE CONSENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 299
according to which treaties (that states have consented to) are a source of law and
bind states as such. This rule is pacta sunt servanda (Art. 26 VCLT). Importantly,
that rule cannot itself be explained by reference to consent as this would imply
a fatal regress. Of course, treaties could be binding as mutual promises or con-
tracts,47 but that is not what their being a source of international law amounts
to. Contracts are merely agreements that are legally enforceable: entering into a
contract affects my legal obligations, but this does not mean that I have made
law.48
Of course, the next question would be how to explain the principle pacta sunt
servanda, the rule of recognition qua general criteria of validity of international
law and, more generally, the existence of a legal system in international law, if it
is not by reference to state consent. These questions need not be settled in this
article. Hart argued pacta sunt servandamerely amounts to a principle of customary
international law.49 He also argued, however, that custom could not amount to a
separate source of law for lack of a rule of recognition and hence of a criterion of
validity determiningwhen a rule of customary international law is in force.50 Since
then, others have rightly argued to the contrary. Although Hart was right about the
distinction between the criterion for the validity of treaties and consent, he was
wrong about the absence of a rule of recognition in international law and about the
lack of general criteria for the validity of international law.51
Thesecondobjectiontostateconsentasacriterion for thevalidityof international
law is descriptive. It sufﬁces to look closely at international treaties and customary
international law, i.e., the two most important sources of international law, to see
that while consent is a requirement in order to be bound by the norms arising
from those sources, it is not used as a criterion of validity. (Multilateral) treaties are
concluded validly without a particular state’s consent, and although they cannot
bind that state, they can bind others. The samemay be said about a customary norm
that cannot bind a persistent objector, but is valid and can bind other states. In sum,
state consent does notwork as a criterion for the validity of international law that is
general. The connection ismore concrete, and it is to the legal obligations stemming
fromvalid international law for a particular state. There seems therefore to be a link
between state consent and the grounds for international legal obligations. Iwill now
turn to this question.
47 Hart, supra note 46, at 220–1. See also Klabbers, supra note 2, at 113.
48 Murphy, supra note 14, at 149.
49 To that extent,Hart arguablyhad apotential answer, albeitwithin the realmof international law, toDworkin
1986’s ‘semantic sting’ and ‘theoretical disagreement’ critique to the rule of recognition. For a co-ordination-
based account of the rule of recognition that combines (i) the existence of a moral duty to co-ordinate with
(ii) theminimal requirement of converging practice instead of full agreement and hence a reply to Dworkin,
more generally, see Besson, supra note 9, at 161–203. Of course, things are slightly more complicated for the
rule of recognition in international law because of the conﬂation between states qua ofﬁcials and states qua
subjects and hence between the internal and external points of view.
50 Hart, supra note 46, at 235–6. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 146.
51 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 147 ff.; M. Payandeh, ‘The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence
of H.L.A. Hart’, (2011) 21 EJIL 967, at 982–5; S. Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’, in S.
Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 163.
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3.2. Consent and the legitimacy of international law
Another understanding of the role of consent in international law-making is that
consent amounts to a ground or justiﬁcation for the legitimate authority of interna-
tional law so produced or identiﬁed.
As JosephRazhaspointedout,however,while consentmayexplainwhypromises
aremorally binding, it does not explain how the law can bind and,more speciﬁcally,
giveusmoral reasons foraction.Onemayindeedconsent todowrong.52 Importantly,
it is not only the plausibility of actual or express consent to the law that is at stake in
this rebuttal, but its conceptual-normative inability even qua hypothetical or tacit
consent to justify the law’s authority.53 This is also the case for the justiﬁcationof the
authority of international law.54 True, consent is a content-independent reason for
action, and we will see later that content-independence matters for the legitimacy
of international law, but it cannot in itself be the justiﬁcation for the authority or
moral bindingness of law.
Of course, as Raz recognizes, consent may constitute an additional reason to
respect the law or have trust in it. However, this does not make it a primary ground
for its authority unless the law respects autonomy and satisﬁes an independent test
of legitimacy.55 Thismatters particularly for international lawbecause consentmay
contribute to enhance the de facto authority of international law by strengthening
respect for it in practice.56 Additional reasons for trust and respect are signiﬁcant
given the pluralist circumstances of international law.
This rejection of consent as a ground of legitimacy also extends to democratic
legitimacy. Democracy is understood here as method of collective decision-making
characterized by equality among the participants, on the one hand, and by their
inclusion in the decision-making process, on the other.
The disconnection between democratic legitimacy and consent may seem coun-
terintuitive to some. Because democratic decision-making implies participation and
voting, indeed, it is often assumed that democratic legitimacy is consent-based.57
Nevertheless, this objection can be easily brushed aside by reference to the major-
itarian principle qua core democratic principle (by contrast to the requirement of
unanimity that would derive from consent).58 What the principle of majority actu-
ally shows is thatdemocracyprotects and is justiﬁedby reference to equality, andnot
to self-determination (thatwould justify, on the contrary, the recourse to consent).59
Moreover, consent and autonomy qua grounds for democracy would be difﬁcult
to reconcile with the circumstances of democracy and democratic deliberation in
52 See Raz, Morality, supra note 8, at 88 ff.; Raz, Ethics, supra note 8, at 80–94; Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority’,
supra note 8, at 1028–9, 1037–40. See also Buchanan, supra note 3.
53 See, more generally, Simmons, supra note 8.
54 See Buchanan, supra note 3; M. Lister, ‘The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law’, (2010) 11
Chicago Journal of International Law 663.
55 See Raz,Morality, supranote 8, at 89; Raz,Ethics, supranote 8, at 355–69; Raz, ‘The ProblemofAuthority’, supra
note 8, at 1028–9, 1037–40.
56 See Besson, supra note 6, at 352, 371–2; Raz,Morality, supra note 8, at 90, 93; Raz, Ethics, supra note 8, at 368–9.
57 See for an explanation of the conﬂation, S. Hershovitz, ‘Legitimacy, Democracy andRazianAuthority’, (2003)
9 Legal Theory 201.
58 See Christiano, supra note 9. See also Hershowitz, supra note 57, at 215; Besson, supra note 6, at 354.
59 See Christiano, supra note 9.
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particular, i.e., disagreement.60 Thepublicly equal advancementof interests requires
indeed that individual participants’ judgments be taken into account equally when
there is reasonable disagreement.61 This applies whether consent is actual or hypo-
thetical given how reasonable and hence persistent disagreement can be.62
All this also holds true for democratic accounts of international legitimacy.63
However, as I will argue, consent plays a distinct role in that context precisely
because the democratic legitimacy of international law cannot be approached in the
usual way. There is no international polity of equals and this means that it is the
domestic democratic legitimacy of states that needs to be taken into account.64
Of course, this leaves uswith the need to explain the importance of participation
and inclusion in democratic legitimacy. Participation seems indeed to imply some
form of consent. As a rejoinder, one should stress that disqualifying consent as a
ground for theobjective legitimacyof lawdoesnot imply setting it aside as a factorof
subjective legitimacy. The latter, and generally acceptance of law, remain important
in practice and arguably even amount to a dimension of objective legitimacy.65 The
same may be said about the importance of participation and subjective acceptance
for the objective legitimacy of international law. Of course, it is not a ground for the
latter and should not be conﬂatedwith it,66 but amounts to an important dimension
of the legitimacy of international law all the same.
Last but not least, consent is often invoked in the context of compliance with
international law, especially within rational choice accounts of international law-
making67 albeit not only.68 Of course, reasons for compliance are not the same as
justiﬁcations of authority. Compliance matters for our purpose, however, because
the effectivity of international law is one, albeit not the sole, dimension of its le-
gitimacy to the extent that international law should be such that it can be obeyed
in practice. If consent affects compliance and the effectivity of international law,
as a result, then it is somehow relevant to its legitimacy. In reply, one may refer to
evidence of other sources of effectivity propounded in rational choice theoretical
accounts of non-consensual international law-making.69 Other factors of compli-
ance are mentioned there such as power or common problem-solving. Moreover,
compliancewith international law is actually secured largely throughdomestic law
60 See Christiano, supra note 9.
61 See Christiano, supra note 9.
62 See also Besson, supra note 9, at 91–119.
63 See A. Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters, and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of
International Law (2009), 289; Besson, supra note 6, at 354.
64 See Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy’, supra note 6; Christiano, ‘Legitimacy of International Institutions’,
supra note 6.
65 See A. Buchanan and R. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, (2006) 20 Ethics and
International Affairs 405.
66 See Besson, supra note 6, at 371; Raz, Ethics, supra note 8, at 360 ff.; Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority’, supra note
8, at 1037 ff.
67 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 3, at 752–3; Helfer, supra note 3, at 73.
68 See, e.g., Pellet, supra note 3, at 37; G. Gaja, ‘Discussion’, in A. Cassese and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), Change and
Stability in International Law-Making (1988), 16, at 16.
69 See actually Guzman, supra note 3; Helfer, supra note 3, at 73.
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in practice and this is often missed in international law scholarship.70 We should
not as a result try to locate the reasons for compliance only in international law and
the way it is made.
Once consent is severed from thepotential grounds of legitimacyof international
law, the next question, of course, is what those grounds actually are and how we
should account for the legitimacy of international law. This question need not be
settled fully here. In short, I have argued elsewhere for a revised Razian concep-
tion of legitimate authority whereby international law binds to the extent that
the (content-independent and exclusionary) reasons it provides enable its subjects
(states and individuals in those states) to comply better with the reasons that ap-
ply independently to them (service conception).71 On that objective conception of
legitimacy, the justiﬁcation of the authority of international law is piecemeal and
its grounds may range from volitional, expressive, epistemic, to co-ordinative reas-
ons. However, my account of the legitimacy of international law is a revised Razian
account to the extent that the main basis of the demand for legitimate authority
is reasonable disagreement about how to structure common action when such ac-
tion is required morally or practically. Accordingly, as I have argued elsewhere, the
justiﬁcation of legitimate authority lies mostly in the co-ordinating ability of inter-
national law in circumstances of reasonable disagreement.72 Moreover, my revised
Razian account of the legitimate authority of international law accommodates the
importance of public and hence democratic authority by recognizing co-ordination
as a ground for general and not just piecemeal authority. I will revert to legitimate
authority later in this article.
Although consent is neither a criterion for the validity of international law
nor a ground for its legitimacy, this does not mean that it should play no role in
international law-making. As a matter of fact, international legal obligations are
never imposed on states without their consent in practice.73 Unlike other authors,
we should not consider this as an unhappy feature of practice that we should be
pragmatic and resigned about. On the contrary, I would like to claim that there is a
normative argument to be made for the role of state consent in international law-
making. But, ﬁrst, let me show how that argument for state consent is not among
the ones usually made by international law scholars.
4. TWO MYTHS ABOUT CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are two myths about the normative role of consent in international law-
making that may explain why it sticks in the practice and scholarship of interna-
tional law despite being disqualiﬁed as a criterion of validity and as a ground of
70 See S. Besson, ‘International Legality – A Reply to Shapiro & Hathaway’, Online symposium, (2011)
Opinio Juris, opiniojuris.org/2011/11/13/opinio-jurisyale-law-journal-symposium-hathaway-and-shapiro-on-
outcasting/ in reply toO.HathawayandS.J. Shapiro, ‘Outcasting: Enforcement inDomestic and International
Law’, (2011) 121 The Yale Law Journal 252.
71 See Besson, supra note 6, at 351 ff.
72 See Besson, supra note 6, at 352 ff.; Besson, supra note 51. See also Dworkin, supra note 3, at 19 ff. for a similar
salience-based account of the legitimate authority of international law.
73 See also Murphy, supra note 14, at 179.
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legitimacy of international law. Those myths pertain to the relationship between
consent and legal positivism (Section 4.1.), and state sovereignty (Section 4.2.). It
is important to debunk those connections to be able to focus in the next section
on what could actually be the justiﬁcation for the role of consent in international
law-making.
4.1. Consent and legal positivism
The ﬁrst myth about state consent is that consent in international law is related to
legal positivismandnecessary to the latter’s success as a legal theoryof international
law. It is common indeed among international lawyers, as it is domestically, to
oppose natural law theories to legal positivist ones. However, the speciﬁcity of that
distinction in international legal scholarship is that legal positivism isoften reduced
to ‘legal voluntarism’ whereby the grounds of law are not only regarded as a matter
of fact, but a matter of will.74
The explanation for this conﬂation is, of course, the role state consent plays in
international law-making, but it also goes deeper historically.
Theﬁrst explanation for this conﬂation is the roleof stateconsent in international
law-making. In reply, one should state that voluntarism is not implied by the idea
that the grounds of law arematters of (social) fact and hence that the law is posited.
There are other ways of positing international law than consent. Even if consent
plays a central role in that process, as it does, it is not a necessary condition thereof.
As a matter of fact, even when state consent is required as in treaty law-making,
considering consent as a criterion for the validity of international law is question-
begging, as I have argued before.
A second explanation for the association between legal positivism and voluntar-
ism,however, ishistorical.75 UntilHart’s accountof legalpositivism, legalpositivists
distinguished positive law frommorality and natural law by reference to will. They
considered states’ will as the relevant fact behind positive law. This was the case in
Grotius’ understanding of international positive law as ‘acts of will’,76 but also later
on, and well into the late nineteenth Century, in the context of German statutory
positivism and its notion of ‘legislative will’.77 This historical connection between
voluntarism and positivism was severed by Hartian legal positivism, however.78
Today, it has only subsisted, it seems, amidst a few international legal positivists,
mostly stemming from rational choice theories of international law.79
74 See, e.g., J.L. Brierly, ‘The Lotus Case’, in H. Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock (eds.), The Basis of Obligation in
International Law and Other Papers by the Late James Leslie Brierly (1958), 142, at 143–4; Clapham, supra note
11; Guzman, Against Consent, supra note 3; Dworkin, New Philosophy, supra note 3, at 5, 8. For a discussion
of the straw-man of positivist voluntarism in international law, see d’Aspremont and Kammerhofer, supra
note 17, at 5, J. d’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in today’s international legal scholarship’, in J. Kammerhofer and
J. d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-ModernWorld (2014), 114, at 144–6.
75 SeeMurphy, supra note 14, at 179–80; D.J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (2010), 138–40.
76 H. Grotius,De iure belli ac pacis, lib. I, Prolegomena, nn. 16–17.
77 See, e.g., G. Anschu¨tz,Drei Leitgedanken derWeimarer Reichsverfassung (1923).
78 See also R. Collins, ‘Classical legal positivism in international law revisited’, in J. Kammerhofer and J.
d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-ModernWorld (2014), 23.
79 See, e.g., J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005); A.T. Guzman,How International
LawWorks – A Rational Choice Theory (2008).
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So, international legal positivism does not require state consent to succeed as a
legal theory. Nor, conversely, does state consent require legal positivism as a legal
theory tomatter in international law-making.One last comment is inordernowthat
the necessarily reference to state consent has been severed from legal positivism. It
is common, as we have just seen, among international law scholars to refer casually
to the term ‘legal voluntarism’ to capture the role of state consent in international
law-making.80 What the discussion in the ﬁrst section has shown, however, is that
consent isnot just theexpressionof thewill, butmuchmore.Reducing theargument
for its importance to voluntarism, as a result, is misleading.
4.2. Consent and state sovereignty
The second myth about the role of consent in international law-making is that it
is tied to sovereignty. This goes back to the early days of international law and
especially to the personiﬁcation of state sovereignty (e.g., as a king). The command
of the sovereign came close to the expression of its will, therefore.
The relationship between state sovereignty and consent carried on well into the
early twentieth Century, however. This is mainly because of the way in which the
Permanent Court of International Justice in SSWimbledon, and many international
lawyers back then, solved the so-called sovereignty paradox.81 Their aim was to
explain how states could incur obligations under international law, and especially
international treaties, and still remain sovereign or, in other words, how they could
be free and not free at the same time. The simple answer was that ‘the right of
entering into international engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty’.82 This
in turnwas only possible because under the Lotus doctrine, ‘the rules of law binding
upon states . . . emanate from their own free will’.83 From then on, consent was
linked to state sovereignty in international law scholarship, and vice-versa.
In reply, one should state, following Endicott’s analogy with individual freedom
inMill,84 that state sovereignty is best understood as state autonomy in an objective
and thick notion of autonomy. This limits what a state can consent to as a sovereign
to what actually enhances its autonomy. It therefore severs sovereignty away from
stateconsent. In turn,what this implies is thatsovereigntyseemstoamounttoa large
extent to what legitimate international law says it is, and not the other way around,
contrary to what consent-based accounts of sovereignty have long defended.85
Of course, thisdoesnotmean thatwhatever international lawsays liesoutside the
scope of sovereignty. There may indeed be restrictions to sovereignty by legitimate
80 See, e.g., d’Aspremont, supra note 74, at 144–6.
81 See J. Klabbers, ‘Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux’, (1998) 3 Austrian Review of
International and European Law 345.
82 PCIJ, S.S.Wimbledon, Judgment of 17 August 1923, PCIJ Rep Series A No 01, para. 25.
83 PCIJ, Lotus Case, supra note 7, para. 35. For a critique, see A. Pellet, ‘Lotus que de sottises on profe`re en ton
nom! Remarques sur le concept de souverainete´ dans la jurisprudence de la Cour mondiale’, in E. Belliard et
al. (eds.), L’Etat souverain dans lemonde d’aujourd’hui –Me´langes en l’honneur de Jean-Pierre Puissochet (2008), 215.
84 T. Endicott, ‘The Logic of FreedomandPower’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.),The Philosophy of International
Law (2010), 245. See also Besson, supra note 6, at 373; S. Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol IX (2012).
85 See Hart, supra note 46, at 223.
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international law that are deemed incompatible with the (objective) autonomy
of sovereign states.86 The legitimacy of international law and the limits to state
sovereignty do not therefore match entirely. The importance of self-determination
in sovereignty can actually be explained along the lines of the autonomy-based
exceptions to the prima facie legitimacy of law in the Razian account. This is also
what Raz calls the ‘independence condition’.87 According to that condition, there
are circumstances in which autonomy requires determining oneself (literally ‘self-
determining’) what to do despite the fact that one would comply with one’s own
reasons better if one did not. It is in those circumstances that state consent can play
a role for the respect of a state’s sovereignty, as I will explain in the next section.
5. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISAGREEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
STATE CONSENT
International legal obligations are never imposed on states without their consent,88
even though it is not consent that explains their validity or legitimacy. The time
has now come to make a normative argument for state consent in international
law-making. After presenting a disagreement-based argument for democratic state
consent (Section 5.1.), I will discuss some of the latter’s inherent limits (Section 5.2.).
5.1. Justiﬁcations of democratic state consent in international law-making
The central role of state consent in contemporary international law-making is jus-
tiﬁed, I would like to argue, for democratic reasons in circumstances of reasonable
disagreement. This revisits and justiﬁes state consent as ‘democratic state consent’.
At ﬁrst, this may read as a paradox. Indeed, domestically, the role of consent has
long been disparaged from a democratic perspective precisely because of reason-
able disagreement. Actually, as I explained before, the equality-based justiﬁcation of
democracy accounts formajority-voting instead of unanimity, thusmaking consent
even less relevant procedurally. Why would it be different internationally? How
could democracy justify the role of state consent in international law if not domest-
ically? After all, reasonable disagreement is likely to be even more widespread and
persistent in international law-making.
The ﬁrst thing to say is that democratic justiﬁcations and conditions in interna-
tional law should not be conﬂated with domestic ones.89 First of all, states should
not be treated as equal individualmembers of an international democratic polity in
the same way as individuals are equal members of a domestic democracy.90 There
is no democracy of states, but should not be one either. States cannot, and should
not be too readily identiﬁed with individual subjects whose basic equality actually
86 See also Besson, ‘Sovereignty’, supra note 84; Besson, supra note 6, at 372–4.
87 Raz, Ethics, supra note 8, at 365–6; Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority’, supra note 8, at 1014.
88 See also Murphy, supra note 14, at 179.
89 For a general discussion of those different options, see S. Besson, ‘Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas. A Republican Account
of the International Community’, in S. Besson & J.L. Martı´ (eds.), Legal Republicanism and Republican Law –
National and Post-National Perspectives (2009), 204.
90 See Besson, supra note 6, at 368–70.
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justiﬁes democracy; the same justiﬁcation couldnot arise from the equality of states.
Secondly, the conditionsof a global democracy for individuals inwhich stateswould
merely act as their ofﬁcials are not (yet) given either. Indeed, in the absence of the
egalitarian pre-conditions for global democracy, and in particular of equal and inter-
dependent stakes shared by all of us internationally, there cannot (yet) be a global
democracy.91 Onemayevenargue thatweshouldnot aimatglobaldemocracy inany
case, in particular by reason of its total(itarian) scope.92 As a result, the legitimacy
of international law cannot and should not strictly speaking be democratic.
All the same, the importance of democratic legitimacy domestically implies
that we should try to ﬁnd a way to respect domestic democracy in the way we
make international law, and especially the political equality of the members of
democratic states – actual ones, of course, but also democratic states in themaking.
Afterall, toquoteThomasChristiano,statesremain‘themostimportantinstitutional
mechanism for making large scale political entities directly accountable to people’
and the sole locus of democracy, as a result.93 The way to link international law-
making processes to domestic democratic legitimacy, arguably, is to respect the
equality of eachdemocratic state qua statespeople.94 Of course, this gives rise towell-
knownand largely irreducible tensions, because state equality andglobal individual
equality are not transitive andmay not be reduced to one another.95 Still, there is no
better way (to date, at least) to protect domestic democratic self-determination on
the global scale than to protect democratic states’ sovereign equality.
The way to protect the equality of states(people) qua collective equality is to con-
sider their consent as a requirement in international law-making. The requirement
of the equal consent of states provides a way for small and weak states to resist the
domination and the hegemony of large and powerful states or coalition of states.96
In turn, states’ equal consent protects the individual members of those states’ right
to an equal voice in the collective decision-making process they are participating in
through their states.97
The upshot is that only democratic states may invoke their consent as a ground
not be bound.98 Of course, democracy is incremental. As a result, all states could be
considered as democracies in themaking.However, as long as theyhavenot attained
91 See also Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy’, supra note 6.
92 See S. Besson, ‘Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context – Decoupling and Recoupling’, (2011) 4
Ethics and Global Politics 19.
93 T. Christiano, ‘The legitimacy of international environmental institutions’, in J. Moss (ed.), Climate Change
and Justice (2015).
94 See also Besson, supra note 6, at 368–70.
95 See Besson, supra note 6, at 369–70; S. Besson, ‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy – A Reply to
Waldron’, (2011) 22EJIL 373 in reply to J.Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Beneﬁt of the International
Rule of Law?’, (2011) 22 EJIL 315; Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy’, supra note 6.
96 See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 2, at 114; E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Polit-
ical Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, (2007–2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 595; E.
Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘Comment on Nico Krisch’, 26 March 2014, www.asil.org/blogs/comment-
nico-krisch-%E2%80%9C-decay-consent-international-law-age-global-public-goods%E2%80%9D, in reply
to Krisch, supra note 4.
97 Christiano, supra note 93. See also J. Klabbers, ‘International legal positivism and constitutionalism’, in J.
Kammerhofer andJ. d’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-ModernWorld (2014), 264, at 285
albeit from a constitutionalist perspective.
98 See also Christiano, supra note 93.
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the minimal democratic standards that have arisen from democratic state practice
in international law,99 their individual members are not treated as equal and the
justiﬁcation for democratic state consent should not work as an exception to the
(independently justiﬁed)authorityof international law.Importantly,asIwillexplain
below, there are limits ondemocratic state consent that aremeant toprotect existing
democracies and individual political equalitywithin those democratic states. These
limits are important to curb the potential anti-democratic consequences of state
consent in practice. They may be used both against democratic states themselves
but also, andmost often, against non-democratic ones.
Importantly, considering democratic state consent as a requirement of interna-
tional law-making does not mean considering it as a ground for its legitimacy: as
we saw before, it simply cannot be such a ground, whether tout court or in a demo-
cratic context. As a matter of fact, the legitimacy of international law is not strictly
speaking democratic.100 As I explained before, its legitimacy is substantive and, ac-
tually, mostly justiﬁed on grounds of co-ordination in circumstances of reasonable
disagreement. Other substantive grounds may, of course, also apply concurrently,
but co-ordination is themost important one due to reasonable disagreement. All the
same, it is precisely because reasonable disagreement among states is widespread
and persistent in international law, on the one hand, and because of the centrality of
democratic states inmaking international power accountable to their people,101 on
the other, that democratic state consent should work as an exception to the prima
facie legitimate authority of international law.
This corresponds to what I explained earlier about state sovereignty and the
exceptions to the legitimacy of international law. There may indeed be restrictions
of sovereignty by legitimate international law that are deemed incompatible with
the autonomy of sovereign states and hence with the justiﬁcation of sovereignty.
The importance of self-determination in sovereignty can be explained along the
lines of the autonomy-based limits to the legitimacy of law in the Razian account of
the legitimate authority of law. The so-called ‘independence condition’ to legitimate
authority is even more important when justifying the authority of law over states
than over individuals. This matters particularly for states whose autonomy reﬂects
their individual members’ autonomy, and especially for democratic states whose
sovereignty is closely linked to democratic self-determination andwhose sovereign
equality protects the self-determination of a statespeople.102 Importantly, however,
this shouldnot turndemocratic state consent intoageneral exceptionof sovereignty
to the legitimate authority of international law; the former only corresponds to an
99 See on these standards, A. Buchanan, ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of International
Legitimacy’, (2011) 10 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5, at 15–16; A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-
determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (2004), at 187–9.
100 See Besson, supra note 6, at 349–50 on the different justiﬁcations for the authority of domestic and interna-
tional law.
101 See also Christiano, supra note 93.
102 See also Besson, ‘Sovereignty’, supra note 84; Besson, supra note 6, at 372–4.
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instantiation of the latter when the state is democratic and the democratic limits
inherent to the justiﬁcation of the exception are respected, as we will see.103
In those conditions, the way in which democratic state consent ties in is merely
as an exception to the legitimate authority of international law that is justiﬁed on
other grounds.When a state consents, the legitimate authority of international law
and the corresponding duties are conﬁrmed. However, when it refuses its consent to
a treaty or objects to a new customary norm, the (legal) duty to obey international
lawmay arise fromwhat has become valid international law for that state just as it
does for others, but thenormdoes not actually bind it (as amoral duty). Importantly,
if the state decides to consent later on to an international legal norm and to lift the
exception, it is bound. This is the case also when its consent cannot be considered
valid, as I will explain in the next section. This is because state consent is not the
ground for the legitimate authority of international law that arises independently
from it, but merely an exception to that authority.104
Democratic state consent qua exception to the legitimate authority of interna-
tional law may take different forms. It may be explicit, but, as I explained before,
it may occur tacitly as well. This could be through statements, but also through
practice or participation. Thus, state consentmay, for instance, take the shape of the
principle of subsidiarity when international human rights courts’ decisions defer
to the democratic implementation and review of international human rights law as
long as there is no European consensus on a given question.105
The proposed account of the role of consent as a democratic exception to the
legitimateauthorityof international lawshouldbedistinguishedfrompresumption-
based approaches to state consent. Jan Klabbers, for instance, understands state
consent in international law as being presumed.106 That presumption of consent
may always be reversed, however. This presumptive role of state consent is puzzling.
Of course, other authors have also drawn on the ICJ’s odd formulation in the Lotus
case according to which ‘restrictions upon the independence of states cannot . . .
be presumed’107 .108 This is, however, a legal procedural feature whose application
to state consent is difﬁcult to understand. It is not because consent is tacit, for
instance after a certain time, that it was presumed in the ﬁrst place. Moreover, the
term ‘presumption’ is used very loosely and it is difﬁcult to know what it refers
to exactly. It is also applied, for instance, to the actual legality of an international
legal norm or to its bindingness, which are very different from state consent itself
being presumed. Finally, even if consent is presumed, it remains important to know
103 The justiﬁcation of the exception of democratic state consent is sovereign equality and not merely equal
sovereignty.
104 Exceptions to legitimate authority should not be conﬂated with exclusions or exemptions from it (as in the
case of justiﬁed exceptionalism e.g.). On the distinction, see Besson, supra note 6, at 374 ff.
105 See, e.g., S. Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law – What is Subsidiary about Human
Rights?’, in N. Barber, R. Ekins, and P. Yowell (eds.), Subsidiarity (2016), forthcoming.
106 See Klabbers, supra note 2, at 111 ff.; Klabbers, supra note 97, at 285 ff.
107 See PCIJ, Lotus Case, supra note 7, para. 35.
108 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 19, 247; M. Wood, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on identiﬁcation of
customary law, 27March 2015, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682, para. 94. See also Hollis, ‘Deﬁning’, supra note 28, at 28
on yet another presumption: the ‘being a treaty’ presumption unless a clear intent to the contrary is stated.
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what role it plays in international law-making. Thus, although Klabbers disparages
consent as a ground for the legitimacy of international law, he retains it as ‘main
criterion of validity’.109
It should be clear bynowhowdifferent the proposedunderstanding of the nature
and role of democratic state consent is fromconsidering it as a ground of democratic
legitimacy. This explains the paradox I started with away. First, it accounts for how
democratic state consent can require unanimitywhile democratic decision-making
is associated to majority. Second, it also explains how democratic state consent is
actually required by the circumstances of reasonable disagreement while the latter
usually makes unanimity impracticable.
Of course, this is not to deny the other helpful features of state consent in inter-
national law when establishing the latter’s validity or strengthening its legitimacy.
First of all, what democratic state consent does in treaty-making is allow for the
salience of the co-ordinating option.110 To that extent, it contributes to the process
of validation of international law in the absence of central institutions and law-
maker.111 This is particularly important in the circumstances of moral and social
pluralism and hence of substantive and epistemic disagreement that apply in in-
ternational law.112 This is even more important as states are collective agents: their
co-ordinating intentmaybedifﬁcult to identify.As amatter of fact, democratic states
are the ofﬁcials of their people and their institutions are themselves made of ofﬁ-
cials, thus making for layers of potential disagreement in any given disagreement.
Secondly, as I alluded to before, consent amounts to a clear and public method for
the creation of content-independent reasons to obey international law.113 It is also
a way to strengthen respect and trust in international law, which may explain why
the de facto authority of international law is quite strong in practice.114
5.2. Limits to democratic state consent in international law-making
While state consent is an important dimension of the validation and legitimation
of international law, there are limits to consent inherent either to its democratic
justiﬁcation or to consent.
The ﬁrst set of limits on democratic state consent pertains to its democratic
justiﬁcation itself: the protection of democratic statespeoples. Those limits arewell-
known in domestic constitutional theory, and include the protection of the basic
conditionsofdemocracy, i.e.,basicpoliticalequality.Withoutabidingbythosevalues
and principles, there can be nomeaningful democracy and they justify constraining
the democratic process, as a result.
More concretely, inherent democratic limits usually take the shape of non-
discrimination rights, on the one hand, and of absolute or minimal human rights
109 See Klabbers, supra note 2, at 122; Klabbers, ‘Validity’, supra note 42, at 554.
110 Consent is not necessary to co-ordinate, however. See also Besson, supra note 6, at 353; Besson, supra note 9,
at 473–5;Waldron, supra note 12, at 25–7.
111 See also Pellet, supra note 3, at 45 on the evidentiary advantages of consent.
112 See also Besson, supra note 6, at 371–2.
113 See Christiano, supra note 93.
114 See Besson, supra note 6, at 345–6, 370–2; Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority’, supra note 8, at 1028–9.
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duties, on the other. In international law, those limits to democratic consent are
sometimes referred to as jus cogens norms, i.e., imperative norms or norms that may
not be derogated from (Art. 53 VCLT).115 Thus, one could not allow for the excep-
tion of democratic state consent to be opposed to absolute rights or duties in an
international human rights treaty, like the prohibition of torture, and to specify
reservations to those provisions, as a result.116 The samemay be said of the limits to
opt-outs of newly independent states from treaty regimes accepted by their prede-
cessors: international succession law usually excludes human rights treaties from
their scope.117 This is also how one should understand the justiﬁcation of so-called
‘objective regimes’ and of third-party obligations in international treaty law.118
Asecondsetof limits inherent todemocratic stateconsenthavetodowithconsent
itself. There are mainly three: the voluntariness of state consent, its fairness, and its
informed nature.119
First of all, democratic state consent can only be invoked as an exception to the
legitimacy of international law provided consent is free and unconstrained.120 This
is also the point of some of the provisions of the VCLT pertaining to the conditions
bearing on the quality of state consent to a treaty and to its potential invalida-
tion/invalidity on those grounds (Arts. 46–52 VCLT; constitutional concerns, error,
fraud, corruption, coercion).121 These limits matter particularly in international
law-makingwhere the power imbalances between states can be very important and
threaten the voluntariness of state consent. Secondly, state consent should be ex-
pressed and potentially exchanged in a fair and egalitarian fashion. The procedures
should be such as to guarantee that fairness, and in particular the respect for the sov-
ereign equality of states that grounds the democratic state consent exception. This
implies adopting procedures that give states equal participation and voting rights
in particular. Finally, state consent should be duly informed to be valid. Thismatters
particularly in pluralistic international relationswhere epistemic disagreement can
bemore important than domestically.
Finally, additional non-inherent limits to state consent could be developed based
on criticisms made by international law scholars to the justiﬁcation of the role of
state consent in international law-making. Importantly, all these critiques can be
accommodated within the democratic justiﬁcation defended in this article. I will
115 See Christiano, ‘Legitimacy of International Institutions’, supra note 6 and 2014; Klabbers, ‘Validity’, supra
note 42, at 570–4.
116 This is a common critique to state consent (e.g., C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1999);
F.R. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (1998)), but it is misplaced, however. See, e.g., Human Rights
Committee, Mr Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 845/1998, 28 March 2002, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998.
117 SeeM.T. Kamminga, ‘State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties’, (1996) 7 EJIL 46.
118 See D.J. Bederman, ‘Third Party Rights and Obligations in Treaties’, in D. Hollis (ed.), Oxford Guide to Treaties
(2014), 328, at 341–5.
119 See Christiano, supra note 93. See also Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘Structures’, supra note 4 on the
additional requirements placed on state consent underWTO law.
120 Of course, there is a well-known difﬁculty in the idea of the freedom of the will: it can only be free (vis-a`-vis
law) if constrained (by law) in order to be free. See also M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’,
(1990) 1 EJIL 1 on this tension with respect to state consent.
121 See, e.g., Klabbers, ‘Validity’, supra note 42.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 May 2016 IP address: 134.21.34.252
STATE CONSENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 311
discuss two of them here: limits in the personal scope of democratic state consent
and limits in its material scope.
First of all, the need for experts. It is a critique that has been developed mostly
in the area of global administrative law (GAL) where consent has actually lost
in importance in practice.122 Of course, as I explained earlier, GAL has not been
developed using the formal sources of international law and does not, to that extent,
contribute to the erosion of the role of state consent within those sources. However,
it is true that it has contributed to the sidelining of those sources tout court in
international law-making and hence of state consent overall. The reasons for this
need to be identiﬁed, therefore, and accommodated if democratic state consent is to
play its role again in these areas of international law-making.
In reply, one should stress, ﬁrst of all, that the expertise critique has been made
against the justiﬁcation of democracy in domestic law as well. This is not the
place to address one of themost difﬁcult objections in democratic theory and scope
precludes doing so. Letme say, however, that part of the answer lies in adaptingone’s
conception of political equality by reference to the epistemic pre-requirements of
democracy. This implies in particular organizing forms of political representation
for the implementation of the choices and objectives identiﬁed by citizens.123 The
same could be done in international law. A rejoinder, however, would be that GAL
can be even more complex than the corresponding domestic legislation. It sufﬁces
to think of international environmental law or ﬁnancial law. Again, there are ways
to accommodate the need to resort to expertswhile justifying the role of democratic
state consent. One could make sure the aims and principles that guide the experts
called to contribute to international law-makingare themselves identiﬁedby formal
sourcesof international lawandhence respectdemocratic state consent.124 Ultimate
democratic state control is key if one is to avoid global technocracy.
Secondly, the exclusion of matters of common concern. A second critique made
to the justiﬁcation of state consent in international law-making has to do with the
co-ordination-based justiﬁcation of the legitimacy of international law. In short,
the argument is that the kind of collective or common action required of states
to protect global public goods or community interests, such as environment or
health, is conceptually incompatible with the role of democratic state consent in
international law-making. This requires excluding state consent from some areas of
international law-making, as a result.125
In reply, one should, ﬁrst, emphasize the broader and more encompassing un-
derstanding of co-ordination on moral issues used in this article. It is very different
from the kind of game-theoretical co-ordination encountered in rational choice the-
ory. It relies in particular on a pre-existing duty to co-ordinate on moral issues in
circumstances of reasonable disagreement. Moreover, the co-ordination argument
122 See B. Kingsbury, ‘TheConcept of “Law” inGlobal Administrative Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 23;Murphy, supranote
14, at 164 ff.; Krisch, supra note 4.
123 See Christiano, ‘Democracy’, supra note 9.
124 See Christiano, supra note 93.
125 SeeHelfer, supra note 3, at 73–4; Guzman, supra note 3; Shaffer, supra note 3; Trachtman, supra note 3; Krisch,
supra note 4, at 3, 6.
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for the legitimate authority of international law applies outside of (transnational)
co-ordination problems stricto sensu and extends to conﬂict and partial-conﬂict co-
ordination over any moral concern over which there is a disagreement and where
having one common take is better than none.126 It therefore extends to trade treat-
ies as much as to human rights treaties or counter-terrorism resolutions. In those
conditions, on the proposed account of democratic state consent, there actually
is a moral duty to abide by international law norms justiﬁed by their ability to
co-ordinate before state consent can be invoked as an exception. This makes an
important difference.
A second reply has to do with the motivation of democratic state consent qua
exception to co-ordination-based international law. As I explained before, it is not
(merely) about the promotion of states’ interests and welfare, as argued by rational
choice theorists but also byothers.127 Not only, for the sake of analogy, are individual
citizens not necessarily motivated solely by their self-interest in a democracy, as I
explainedbefore, but states are institutional constructs that canactuallybedesigned
to decide in anon-self-interested fashion. State consent extends to ourmoral reasons
asmembers of those democratic states, including our community-oriented reasons.
There is no reason therefore to fear that democratic state consent necessarily be
invoked to obtain self-interested exceptions to international law pertaining to the
protection of community interests and to collective international action aiming at
protecting them. One should also stress the potential of international institutional
design in the regimes of international law that face collective action problems.128
6. CONSENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW-MAKING
Theproposedaccountofdemocratic stateconsentﬁtsand justiﬁes thecontemporary
practice of the formal sources of international lawwhere consent still plays a central
role.With its revised understanding, justiﬁcation and limits, itmay even contribute
to bringing states back to these sources in the future, and away from informal law-
making, to the beneﬁt of domestic democracy and accountability of international
law to statespeople themselves.
What I would like to show in this section, more speciﬁcally, is that the proposed
disagreement-attuned understanding of consent accounts particularly well for the
dualistic, and prima facieparadoxical, practice of international law. Indeed, that prac-
tice actually demonstrates both traits of agreement anddisagreement. Likedomestic
law, international law-making has ways to channel andmanage disagreement so as
126 See Besson, supra note 9, at 161 ff., 459 ff., 503 ff.; Besson, supra note 6, at 352–3, 367 for a full argument;
J. Waldron, ‘Authority for Ofﬁcials’, in L.H. Meyer, S.L. Paulson and T.W. Pogge (eds.), Rights, Culture and
the Law: Themes from the legal and political philosophy of Joseph Raz (2003), 45, at 49. Contra: M. Kumm, ‘The
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and Beyond
the State’, in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? International Law, Global Governance,
Constitutionalism (2009), 258, at 298.
127 This is a common critique to state consent (e.g., Charney, supra note 3; Tomuschat, supra note 3; B. Simma,
‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests in International Law’, (1994) 250 Recueil des cours de l’Acade´mie de
droit international 217), but it is misplaced, however.
128 See for various proposals, Christiano, supra note 93.
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tomakethemostof it, ontheonehand,withoutbeingunderminedby it, ontheother.
This can be exempliﬁed on the basis of the current practice of treaty law-making
(Section 6.1.) and of customary law-making (Section 6.2.).
6.1. Consent and disagreement in international treaty law-making
While international treaty law-making is often considered as the epitome of law-
making by consent and hence by agreement, a closer look shows that reasonable
disagreementamounts toapermanentconcernof the secondary rulesof treaty law. If
it is true that treaties are the expression ofmutual consent and cannot be concluded
without consent, consent need not imply complete agreement. Instead, treaties
are arguably best approached as incompletely theorized agreements or, at least,
as agreements to disagree. This may be exempliﬁed by the rules on reservations,
on interpretation and on intractable treaty conﬂicts in the international law of
treaties.129
Firstofall,disagreementandtherulesontreatyreservations(Arts.19–20VCLT).130
Treatyreservationsare formsofbilateral sub-agreementswithinamultilateralagree-
ment that allow for pockets of disagreement to subsist on the detail. Theymake the
conclusionof treatiespossibledespite remainingdisagreementson issuesother than
the object and aim of those treaties (Art. 19(c) VCLT). Of course, such disagreements
within the agreement are only allowed provided the states parties agree to disagree
(Art. 19(a) and (b) VCLT). That agreement is usually tacit, however (e.g., Art. 20(5)
VCLT). Interestingly, reservations areneverdeﬁnitive andmayalwaysbewithdrawn
(Art. 22 VCLT), thereby extending consent later on to thewhole treaty – a treaty that
was actually valid and binding, except for the reserving state, since its ﬁrst entry
into force.
One of the controversies in this context is what should happen to the consent to
the treaty incaseareservation isdeemedincompatiblewith the treaty (Art. 19VCLT).
The rule is that the parties usually ought to decide individually on the approval of
reservations and objections thereto (Art. 21 VCLT). This implies that state consent
should always be respected even when a reservation is deemed invalid and that the
question of the bindingness of the treaty as a whole arises again. In the context
of international human rights treaties, however, international human rights courts
andbodiesusually impose theconclusionof the treaty,with theprovisions thatwere
theobjectof the reservation, ontoall statesparties, including the reserving states and
theothers,without requesting their consent.131 Thishas been criticized for violating
the principle that international legal obligations are never imposed without state
consent.132 However, based on the argument I made earlier about the limits on
129 See, e.g., Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty, supra note 20; Binder, supra note 10; Klabbers, ‘On Human Rights’,
supra note 20; Klabbers, Treaty Conﬂicts, supra note 20; Ranganathan, supra note 10.
130 See, e.g., Aust, supra note 39, Ch. 8.
131 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 on issues relating to reservations made upon
ratiﬁcation or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations
under Art. 41 of the Covenant, 11 November 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 18.
132 See, e.g., R. Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations and state Consent’, (2002) 96 AJIL 531;
Craven, supranote43, at495–7;C.J. Redgwell, ‘Reservations toTreaties andHumanRightsCommitteeGeneral
Comment No 24 (52)’, (1997) 46 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 390; Higgins, supra note 43.
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democratic state consent, and especially absolute or minimal core human rights
duties, applying the human rights treaty in question in its entirety, and without
the invalid reservations, on the mere grounds of the original state consent may be
justiﬁed.133 After all, democratic state consent only amounts to an exception to the
obligations arising out of international treaties on other grounds and an exception
whose justiﬁcation isnotnecessarily granted, especially in the context of imperative
and core duties of international human rights law.
Secondly, disagreement and the rules on treaty interpretation (Arts. 31–32
VCLT).134 Treaty interpretation is another context in which disagreement may re-
appear despite the primary consent to be bound and agreement to the content and
wording of the treaty. Articles 31 and 32 provide various canons and methods of
interpretation for states to use in the process of ‘auto-interpretation’ of their treaties.
Theyaremeant tomanagepotential disagreements about theirmeaning, but remain
verybroadandpluralistic in the constraints they set on the interpretationof treaties.
There is one principle, in particular, that draws attention in this context, and
that is Article 31(3) VCLT. It envisages different ways in which the subsequent
agreements of the state parties, when different from the original one, may be used
to revise the content of the primary agreement (the treaty in question), whether
they actually pertain to the latter (a) ormore generally (b). This is a conﬁrmation, to
quote Klabbers, of the idea of treaty practice as one of ‘continuing negotiations’.135
Further, the reference to ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties’ under Article 31(3)(c) VLCT conﬁrms that the kind of
concurrent and continuing agreement at stake in treaties (but also outside treaties)
amounts to more than a concurrence or sequence of mere overlapping consensus
or strategic compromises. Or else it could not be squared with the requirement of
normative coherence in interpretation across international law.
Finally, disagreement and the rules on intractable treaty conﬂicts (Art. 30(4) and
(5) VCLT). Treaty conﬂicts are another area of resurgence of disagreement once a
treaty has been concluded. While the VCLT entails rules of conﬂict (e.g., Art. 30(1)
to (3) VCLT) that may tame fears about the ‘fragmentation’ of international law,136
it also refers, in Article 30(4) and (5) VCLT, to the possibility of intractable conﬂicts
betweentreatieswithnon-identicalpartiesordeliberatelycreated treatyconﬂicts.137
Importantly, these provisions offer no clear rule of conﬂict and hence no way to
resolve those conﬂicts. They acknowledge rather that consent may sometimes be
used to agree to disagree and not to agree completely on a given issue. To quote
Surabhi Ranganathan, treaty conﬂicts of this kind are best approached as ‘conduits
for legal change’.138
133 See also Klabbers, ‘On Human Rights’, supra note 20, albeit for other reasons.
134 See, e.g., R. Gardiner, ‘The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation’, in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford
Guide to Treaties (2012), 475–506.
135 Klabbers, ‘On Human Rights’, supra note 20, at 181.
136 See, e.g., the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:
Difﬁculties arising from the Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law’, 13 April 2006, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682.
137 See Klabbers, Treaty Conﬂicts, supra note 20, at 90; Ranganathan, supra note 10, at 87 ff.
138 See Ranganathan, supra note 10, at 91.
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6.2. Consent and disagreement in international customary law-making
By contrast to treaties, customary international law is often regarded as less ‘consen-
sual’, at least to the extent that the practice and opinio juris need only be general and
not unanimous for a custom to arise.
This does not mean, of course, that the two elements, i.e., convergent practice
and opinio juris, are not consent-oriented: they are.139 Still, consent need not be
secured completely for customto arise out of that ‘consensus’. As a result, customary
international lawmay seem prima facie to bind some states without or even against
their consent. Importantly, however, this is only the case provided a state does not
object expressly and persistently to the emerging consensus (persistent objection).
It may therefore dissent, and so-doing it can withdraw the consent it was otherwise
giving tacitly.140
To that extent, like international treaties, customary international law cannot
impose obligations on stateswithout their consent.141 However, unlike treaties, cus-
tomary international law-making does not startwith an agreementwhichmay then
be nuanced through various agreements to disagree. It starts despite disagreement,
or with some form of tacit agreement, but that disagreement/agreement may then
be set aside, however, through an express disagreement (to agree). One form of con-
sent is active or express, while the other is passive or tacit. Another difference is
that the expression of state consent in customary law-making can be unilateral (and
juxtaposed) and not necessarily mutual, whereas it is often, albeit not necessarily,
mutual in treaty law-making.
Thesedifferencesbetweentheplaceofdemocraticstateconsent inthetwosources
lies arguably in their respective scope. Because customary international law has a
universal scope, individual state agreement cannot realistically be expressed and
hence should not be. In treaty law-making, by contrast, the scope of states parties
is more limited or at least, in the case of multilateral treaties, spread out over time,
thus making the actual expression of agreement feasible and hence required from
the start.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This article opened with a paradox: international law-making is ridden with reas-
onable disagreement and yet no state can be bound by international lawwithout its
consent and hence without agreement.
Breaking away from the pragmatic resignation that prevails among international
law scholars on this question, I have proposed an interpretation of the role of state
consent that both ﬁts and justiﬁes the central role of state consent in the practice
139 See also Allott, supra note 1, at 39.
140 See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 21; Klabbers, Treaty Conﬂicts, supra note 20, at 113 ff.; Crawford, supra note 19,
247; M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules – International Relations and Customary International Law
(1999), 142–6; P.Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’, (1983) 77 AJIL 413, at 433–4.
141 This consent-based understanding of persistent objections in the formation of customary international law
has been conﬁrmed inWood, ThirdReport, supranote 108, at 61–9. Contra: Tasioulas, supranote 16; Guzman,
supranote3, at 775 ff.; P.Dumberry, ‘Incoherent and Ineffective: TheConceptof PersistentObjectorRevisited’,
(2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 779; Lau, supra note 3.
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of international law-making and, hopefully, may help strengthening the latter’s
legitimacy in the future. The justiﬁcation put forward actually lies in the circum-
stances of reasonable disagreement among democratic states. It thereby dissolves
the paradox.
I started by arguing that, in international law as domestically, consent is neither a
criterion of validity of lawnor a ground for its legitimate authority. I then explained
how state consent is related to and required by neither legal positivism nor state
sovereignty.Unlikewhatwas the case earlier in thehistoryof international law, both
can be defended today without endorsing state consent as a basis for international
legal obligations and vice-versa.
Instead, the roleofdemocratic state consent, I argued, is thatof anexception to the
legitimate authority of international law and hence to its bindingness in a concrete
case. While the legitimacy of international law is not democratic, the democratic
nature of states and their democratic accountability to their people need to be
taken into account in international law-making. This is especially the case in the
circumstances of widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement that prevail
among and within democratic states in international law. This is best done, I have
argued, by respecting the sovereign equality of democratic states and hence their
consent as theway to grant an equal voice to their people. Of course, there are limits
to thedemocratic state exception that are inherent to both its democratic dimension
(andhave todowithbasicpolitical equality) and its consensualdimension (andhave
to do with consent being expressed in a free, fair and informed fashion). When the
limits apply, the exception of state consent is lifted and the state is bound by the
international law normwhose validity and legitimacy are justiﬁed independently.
I concluded by showing how the proposed disagreement-attuned account of
democratic state consent ﬁts and justiﬁes the main international law-making pro-
cesses, i.e., treaties and custom. Despite being both based on state consent, albeit in
an active or express way for treaties and in a passive or tacit way for custom, they
both feature traits of disagreements to agree that cannot be accounted for other-
wise. They also provideways tomanage reasonable disagreement, as it is the case in
domestic law, and those mechanisms are in need of further exploration.
